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Abstract
Addressing issues of social diversity, we introduce a model of housing trans-
actions between agents who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay. A
key assumption is that agents’ preferences for a location depend on both an
intrinsic attractiveness and on the social characteristics of the neighborhood.
The stationary space distribution of income is analytically and numerically
characterized. The main results are that socio-spatial segregation occurs if
– and only if – the social influence is strong enough, but even so, some so-
cial diversity is preserved at most locations. Comparison with data on the
Paris housing market shows that the results reproduce general trends of price
distribution and spatial income segregation.
Keywords: housing market model, income segregation, social diversity,
agent-based model
J.E.L. codes: R31; C61; C62; C63
Don’t buy the house, buy the neighborhood (Russian proverb)
1. Introduction
People’s choice of residential location and the way they are distributed
across cities matter, from both social and economic points of view. This
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article seeks to explain, from the dynamics of price formation in an urban
housing market, how individuals who are heterogeneous in their willingness
to pay are distributed over a city. It shows that, under certain conditions
on social interactions, housing price formation can entail income segregation,
even if a space of social diversity remains.
A large literature is concerned with evaluating the extent and impact
of housing price discrimination in education, housing and the labor market.
While Brueckner et al. (1999) explain that the relative location of different
income social groups depends on the spatial pattern of amenities in a city,
Gobillon et al. (2007) highlight the adverse labor-market outcomes due to
spatial mismatch, with low-skilled inhabitants of the inner-city suffering a
greater distance to jobs and consequently a higher level of unemployment.
Understanding the formation of prices in the real estate market and the way
that prices are distributed over space is clearly an important issue. Following
the path opened by Rosen (1974), most studies have focused on explaining
prices through hedonic estimations, showing how the price per square meter
can be influenced both by variables intrinsic to the apartment or house and
by extrinsic variables concerning the surrounding area and its amenities.
The role of these extrinsic variables has been particularly explored. Baltagi
& Bresson (2010) underline how much the location influences the price of
a dwelling. Ioannides & Zabel (2003), Figlio & Lucas (2004), Bono et al.
(2007) or Seo & Simons (2009) emphasize the importance of the quality
and density of the neighborhood, the reputation of nearby schools and the
level of security. Following Tiebout (1956), these authors point out that the
decision of where to live is based on families’ preferences for the quality of
public services and amenities, particularly education. Thus, prices on the
real estate market vary with the quality of a bundle of public services which
are capitalized into housing prices.
One question underlined by the studies cited above is that of people’s
preferences. Do they prefer to live with people who are richer than they
are, or poorer? In other words, what determines the social component of
the attractiveness of a location? The literature on well-being tends to argue
that people feel better when those around them are poorer (for a detailed
survey see Luttmer (2005)). Clark & Oswald (2002) show empirically that
unemployed people are less unhappy when they live with other unemployed
people. Goyal & Ghiglino (2010) explore the role of shifting social interac-
tions: they use examples to illustrate how poorer individuals lose while richer
ones gain as we move from an economically segregated society towards an
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integrated society. In line with the literature on hedonic prices which high-
lights the importance of the environment, we explore here the consequences
of the alternative hypothesis that individuals prefer to live with people who
are at least as rich as themselves. Indeed, some preliminary studies suggest
that the interplay between social preferences and the preference for a high
quality of local amenities has more striking effects when the social preference
is to live with richer neighbors.
When the prices depend not only on the intrinsic characteristics of the
goods but also on the level of surrounding amenities, as well as on some
social preferences, the space is differentiated and a social mismatch may
result. Different measures of segregation have been proposed. Alesina &
Zhuravskayay (2011) measure segregation of different ethnic, religious and
linguistic groups within the same country from quite an exhaustive data set
covering several different countries. Cutler et al. (1999) show the influence
of legal barriers on social segregation, while Jenks & Meyer (1990) or Cutler
et al. (2008) evaluate the effect of segregation on the socioeconomic perfor-
mance of minorities. Echenique & Fryer (2007) develop a spectral index of
segregation related to the characteristics of social interactions. This index is
defined at the individual level and is higher when the considered individual
interacts with segregated individuals. Ballester & Vorsatz (2010) propose a
random-walk-based segregation measure. For the present work, interesting
results are obtained by considering simple measures of multigroup segrega-
tion, which compare, for a population in a given local neighborhood, the
observed distribution of a given feature (here income) with the uniform dis-
tribution. A basic segregation index in the line of Reardon & Firebaugh
(2002) and Alesina & Zhuravskayay (2011) is proposed and compared to the
information-theoretic measure of Theil (1967), which was introduced into
economics for measuring income heterogeneity.
The pioneering modeling work of Schelling (1971) describes residential
segregation as emerging from social preferences alone. Since then, extensions
have been proposed by several authors in order to integrate a housing mar-
ket. In Bernard & Willer (2007), the price of a house depends on an intrinsic
component of the location, randomly allocated, and on the composition of
the neighborhood. In Fossett & Senft (2003), the price only depends on
an intrinsic component of the location uniformly distributed over the city.
However, the level of quality of locations does not directly impact the choice
made by individuals. In Zhang (2004), the price varies according to the
density of occupation of the neighborhood, but does not take into account
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any measure of house quality. In Bernard & Willer (2007), the choice of a
location depends on the mean status of the neighborhood, the status being a
wealth-related quantity randomly allocated to the individuals. The present
work goes further, dealing with the individual attractiveness of a location and
its influence on prices: in our model, the individuals choose a location ac-
cording to its attractiveness, which is a dynamic quantity depending on both
the intrinsic characteristic of the location and the (time-dependent) social
composition (measured by the levels of income) of the neighborhood. The
prices then depend on the attractiveness through the market dynamics. The
framework introduced here can easily be adapted to make the attractiveness
reflect different characteristics of the locations and different types of social
preferences. It also has the advantage of allowing for detailed mathematical
analysis.
The present article focuses on spatial income segregation, leaving aside
all other features (such as ethnic characteristics) that may also cause segre-
gation. The model proposed here takes some inspiration from Short et al.
(2008) and Berestycki & Nadal (2010), who model the evolution of the spatial
distribution of crime in a city, attributing to each location an attractiveness
for illegal activity. The originality here is that each agent attributes to each
location a specific level of attractiveness. This attractiveness results from
a combination of an intrinsic or objective part, and a subjective part. The
endogenous (subjective) attractiveness results from the individuals’ intrin-
sic social preferences (for neighbours with similar or higher incomes). The
main assumptions are: (i) people make decisions according to both their
willingness to pay (WTP) and their individual evaluation of the level of at-
tractiveness of the different locations; (ii) buyers, who are heterogeneous in
their WTP, base their search for housing on the level of attractiveness of the
location of the dwelling; (iii) agents are both buyers and sellers; (iv) the
intrinsic attractiveness is spatially heterogeneous.
The results are demonstrated through mathematical analysis and then
empirically confirmed in the simulations and in the empirical analysis using
data on the Paris housing market. The analysis of the stationary regime
reached by the market dynamics is first performed for an arbitrary, spatially
heterogeneous, intrinsic attractiveness. For illustrative purposes and to com-
pare with the empirical data, the analysis is then conducted in more detail
for specific cases. First, we consider the case of a monocentric city defined
by an intrinsic attractiveness which decreases with the distance from the
geographical center. This is a simple case motivated by the classical Von
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Thu¨nen model and Alonso’s study of land use (see Alonso (1964)), explain-
ing how, generally, prices are higher in the center of a city or a county. The
fact that prices diffuse from the center to the periphery (with higher prices
in the center) has more recently been highlighted in a regional context by
Clapp et al. (1995), Meen (1996), Berg (2002), Oikarinen (2005) or Holly
et al. (2010). The monocentric case also provides a first order approxima-
tion to the description of the Paris housing market. Second, we consider a
more complex structure of the intrinsic attractiveness, allowing for a better
comparison with empirical data on transaction prices in Paris.
This article exhibits three important results. The first concerns the math-
ematical analysis of the model. This analysis is first presented for an arbitrary
intrinsic attractiveness. This provides general results. The results are then
specified for the particular case of a monocentric city and this monocentric
case is simulated. For the empirical validation, we consider a more complex
structure of the intrinsic attractiveness which matches the Paris data quite
well. Within this theoretical framework, we provide an analytic description
of the spatial distributions of transaction prices and incomes in the city. We
prove that, when the market is not saturated, social segregation occurs if and
only if the social influence is strong enough.
In this case, and this is the second important result, the general analytical
solution underlines the emergence of critical endogenous thresholds in income
and intrinsic attractiveness. The income threshold induces a segregation
between those with an income above the threshold (whom we shall call the
rich agents) and the others. These rich agents can freely choose their location,
and they are the only ones to have access to locations above the threshold in
intrinsic attractiveness. For agents below the income threshold, the housing
possibilities are restricted to a subset of locations. Applied to a monocentric
city, this gives that: (i) people with a higher income live closer to the city
center while the poorer people live in the periphery; (ii) the rich agents are
the only ones to live within a certain endogenous critical distance from the
center, but there is no segregation amongst the rich agents within this central
domain; (iii) agents below the income threshold have access to locations
at distances greater than endogenous thresholds (the poorer the agent the
greater the critical distance); (iv) at any location outside the center, except
at the very periphery where only the poorest live, there is always some social
mixing. And this is the third important result: if the first of these results,
(i), is expected and in line with most of the literature, the preservation of
social diversity, on the one side amongst the richest agents at the center, and
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on the other side in a large domain between the center and the periphery, is
particularly original and proved robust for a wide range of parameter values.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions
and the dynamics of the agent-based model. Section 3 reviews the key pa-
rameters of the model. Section 4 deals with the mathematical analysis of
the equilibrium states. Section 5 describes the conditions under which seg-
regation occurs. Section 6 presents numerical simulations for a simple case,
that of a monocentric city. Section 7 considers a case allowing for a better
comparison between simulated and empirical data. The conclusion follows.
2. The agent-based model: assumptions and dynamics
An agent-based model of residential location is proposed. In this model,
agents make their decision according to both their income (characterized by
an idiosyncratic willingness to pay) and their individual evaluation of the
level of attractiveness of the different locations.
The assumptions of the model are presented below.
2.1. Time, space and goods
• Time is discrete and indexed by t. The time increment is δt (in the
numerical simulations in Sections 6 and 7, δt = 1 is the numerical time
step; in the mathematical analysis in Section 4.1, the continuous limit
δt→ 0 will be taken). The horizon is infinite.
• We consider a ’city’ defined as a discrete set Ω of locations X uniformly
distributed on a bounded open set Ω˜ in R2.
The origin O is taken as the geographical center of the city, and we
denote by D(X) the Euclidean distance from the center to a location
X. The total number of locations is Card(Ω) = L2, and the space is
of linear size (diameter) D = aL, where a gives the typical distance
between two neighboring locations (we therefore have D(X) ≤ aL/2).
• In the city, there is a total number N of goods (housing for sale) with
identical intrinsic characteristics. The same number N = N /L2 of
dwellings is available at each location X in Ω.
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2.2. Agents
At each period (given time t), there is a finite number of agents in the
economy, who can be in one of the three following states: (1) buyer, (2)
seller, (3) housed. We assume an infinite “reservoir” of agents outside the
city. Agents in the reservoir are heterogeneous in their income - they are
indiscernible except for their income category.
From this reservoir, at each time step t a constant number Γδt of randomly-
chosen agents arrive on the market. They are new buyers who join the buyers
who did not buy a dwelling in the previous period. At the same time, housed
agents become sellers at a homogeneous rate α. So the goods available for
sale at a given location are those put on the market by these agents plus, if
any, those that have not yet sold. Then matching occurs between buyers and
sellers at each location (see below, Section 2.7, for the detailed rule). Sellers
who succeed in selling their good leave the market and return to the external
reservoir.
Note that the total number of agents of each type - buyers, sellers and
housed - are dynamical variables since they depend on the success rate of the
previous period and on the inflow and outflow rates. In what follows, the
term ”insiders” designates agents who are already housed (former successful
buyers), while ”outsiders” designates agents looking for a flat.
2.3. Demand prices
Agents are characterized by their willingness to pay (hereafter WTP),
which determines the maximum price the agent is ready to pay for an asset.
For simplicity, we consider a finite number K of WTP. Agents with the same
willingness to pay are denoted by k-agents, k ∈ {0, ..., K−1}, and have WTP
Pk. These WTP are ordered by increasing values, P0 < P1 < ... < PK−1.
When the agent is acting as a buyer, his demand price is P dk = Pk. The
agent’s WTP also determines his behaviour as a seller, as explained below.
Whenever needed, notably in Section 5.6, the theoretical analysis will be
done assuming an even distribution of the Pk values between a minimum
value, P0, and a maximum value, P0 + ∆:
Pk = P0 + k
∆
K−1 , k = 0, ..., K − 1, (1)
so that ∆
K−1 is the constant increment between two consecutive prices. In
addition, throughout this paper we assume that these K WTP values are
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uniformly distributed among the agents in the external reservoir. Hence,
among the Γδt new incoming agents at any time t, a fraction 1/K has WTP
equal to Pk, k ∈ {0, ..., K − 1}. These are not restrictive hypotheses, as
shown in the Appendix, Section A.4.
2.4. Attractiveness
The attractiveness Ak(X, t) of a location X at time t, for a k-agent,
depends on both (1) an intrinsic attractiveness, A0(X), resulting from the
location’s intrinsic objective characteristics (e.g. local amenities), indepen-
dent of the agent category, and (2) subjective characteristics which depend
on the agent’s social preferences, that is his preferences concerning the social
characteristics of the neighborhood. This attractiveness matters both when
the agent is a seller (see 2.5 below) and when he is a buyer (see 2.7 below).
2.4.1. The intrinsic attractiveness
The intrinsic attractiveness, A0(X), idiosyncratic to the position consid-
ered, is here assumed to be time-independent. This means that we consider
the time scale of transactions to be much shorter than that involved in the
transformation of amenities, which we do not take into account.
2.4.2. Attractiveness dynamics
The attractiveness Ak(X, t) is a subjective attractiveness, whose value
depends on the WTP of the agent looking at the location X. At each time
step, new arrivals at the location X modify the social composition at this
location, and the attractiveness evolves accordingly. Once the transactions
between t and t + δt have occurred (as described below), the attractiveness
Ak(X, t) of a location X as seen by a k-agent is updated according to:
Ak(X, t+ δt) = Ak(X, t) + ωδt (A
0(X)− Ak(X, t)) + δt Φk(X, t) (2)
where Φk(X, t) formalizes how the transactions at time t affect the attrac-
tiveness according to the social preferences of the agents of WTP category
k. We assume Φk(X, t) = 0 whenever no transaction occurred at time t: the
time evolution (2) then implies that, when there is no transaction at a given
location for a certain amount of time, the attractiveness relaxes towards its
intrinsic value A0(X). In the present work we assume that the attractiveness
of a location for an agent increases when more agents with similar or higher
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incomes are housed at this location. This is done by choosing Φk(X, t) pro-
portional to the number of new buyers with WTP greater or equal to the
agent’s WTP. Hence we write:
Ak(X, t+ δt) = Ak(X, t) + ωδt (A
0(X)− Ak(X, t))) + δt vk>(X, t) (3)
with
vk>(X, t) =
∑
k′≥k
vk′(X, t) (4)
where vk(X, t) is the density of k-buyers in location X who complete a trans-
action at time t. Here and in all that follows, what we mean by density is a
number
over the elementary surface area, a2.
Note that the level of attractiveness for a given WTP category depends
on the intensity of the demand from agents of similar or higher category: the
higher the demand, the higher the level of attractiveness.
2.5. Offer prices
For each k-agent acting as a seller, his willingness to sell is determined
by his WTP, Pk, and by the intensity of the demand, through the level of
the mean attractiveness of the location. Specifically, the offer price P ok (X)
set by a k-agent selling a good at location X is given by:
P ok (X) = P
0 + (1− exp(−ξA¯(X, t))) Pk (5)
where P 0 is the minimum price of an offer, ξ is a parameter, and A¯(X, t) is
the average attractiveness of location X at time t, that is:
A¯(X, t) ≡ 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
Ak(X, t). (6)
For a good at location X which has not yet been exchanged, the offer price
is given by:
P o(X) = P 0 + (1− exp(−ξA¯(X, t))) P 1 (7)
Note that for ξ small, the offer prices are all equal to P 0, with, for ξ small
enough, P ok (X) = P
0 + ξA¯(X, t)Pk and P
o(X) = P 0 + ξA¯(X, t)P 1, whereas
for ξ large, the offer prices are, respectively, P ok (X) = P
0 + Pk and P
o
k (X) =
P 0 + P 1.
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2.6. Transaction prices.
At location X, a transaction between a k-buyer (hence with demand
price P dk = Pk) and a k
′-seller with offer price P ok′(X) given by (5), can be
completed if Pk > P
o
k′(X). If such a transaction occurs, the transaction price
is assumed to be a linear combination of offer and demand prices:
Ptr = (1− β)P ok′(X) + βPk (8)
where β is a constant coefficient. Similarly, for a good exchanged for the first
time, the transaction price is Ptr = (1− β)P o(X) + βPk,
with P o(X) given by (7).
2.7. Market dynamics: the matching
The market dynamics is then as follows, starting at time t = 0 with an
empty city and the attractiveness set to its intrinsic value. At each time step
(between times t and t+ δt):
1. On the demand side. For each k ∈ {0, ..., K − 1}, the total number
of k-buyers (outsiders) in the city is the sum of a constant number Γ
K
δt
of new buyers (coming from the reservoir), and of the k-buyers, if any,
who are already present but have not yet bought a home. Each of these
agents decides to visit one particular location. The probability pik(X) for
a k-buyer to visit a given location X, depends on the attractiveness of the
location:
pik(X, t) =
1− exp(−λAk(X, t))∑
X′∈Ω 1− exp(−λAk(X ′, t))
. (9)
For small λ (that is for λmaxk,X Ak(X, t) << 1), this is equivalent to:
pik(X, t) =
Ak(X, t)∑
X′∈Ω Ak(X
′, t)
(10)
These decisions, being made in parallel by all the outsiders, determine the
demand at each location.
The above rule (9) can be seen as resulting from a search process where
the agent requires a minimum acceptable level of quality. This latter
is based on the relative attractiveness and on an additional component,
corresponding to private information and/or local idiosyncratic character-
istics of the good. This can be modeled as a random variable, so that in
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the end, the probability of selecting a location is an increasing function
of Ak(X, t). The precise rule, Equ. (9), is not meant to assume some
specific properties of the unknown random component, but is chosen for
its simplicity and for the smoothness properties of the resulting search
process.
2. On the offer side. At each location, the goods offered are (i) those
which have not yet been sold, if any; (ii) those put on sale by the current
owner at some previous time step and not yet sold, if any; (iii) goods
newly put on the market by a fraction α of the remaining insiders.
3. The matching. We presented above the search process on the demand
side. On the offer side, the search process is as follows. At each location,
one of the sellers is selected by random draw (game against Nature); this
seller then picks at random one of the potential buyers among those ap-
plying at this location and having a large enough WTP (see 2.6 above),
and the transaction occurs. This is repeated until no offer or no buyer
remains. Remember that sellers who succeed in selling their good leave
the market, returning to the external reservoir.
The matching rule is convenient for the mathematical analysis. In the
numerical simulations, we also test an alternative matching rule: sellers
are treated in order of increasing offer price, the buyers being randomly
chosen as in the previous case.
4. Updating of the attractiveness Once the transactions have oc-
curred, the attractiveness {Ak(X, t); k = 0, ..., K − 1;X ∈ Ω} is updated
as explained in 2.4 above, Equ. (3).
3. Model parameters and key features
Let us now summarize the set of key parameters that characterize the
model.
The model behaviour depends on the following set of control parame-
ters: (1) the incoming rate, that is the number Γ of new agents entering
the economy per unit of time; (2) the rate α at which agents leave the city;
the parameters in the attractiveness dynamics, that is, (3) the time scale
1/ω of relaxation towards the intrinsic value, and (4) the weight of the so-
cial influence, ; (5) the parameter ξ which fixes the relevant scale of the
attractiveness values in the offer prices (see Eq. (5)). Finally, there are two
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structural control parameters: the intrinsic attractiveness, A0(X), and the
social influence term, Φk, in the dynamics of the attractiveness, Eq. (2).
As we will see, the five control parameters only matter through three
particular (dimensionless) effective parameters:
• The product
ξ˜ ≡ ξA0max (11)
where A0max is the maximum intrinsic attractiveness. The regime of interest
is the one of not too large values of ξ˜, for which
the offer prices are smoothly modulated by the attractiveness.
• The ratio of incoming to outgoing rates, Γ
α
. We are concerned with
a parameter regime for which an equilibrium exists with no saturation (as
explained in the next section). This requires an equality between the mean
inflow and outflow of agents, with a number of buyers that does not saturate
the market. One global necessary condition is that this ratio must be smaller
than the number of goods per location, that is:
Γ
αN =
γ
α n
< 1 (12)
where
γ ≡ Γ/D2 (13)
is the mean incoming rate per surface area, and n = N /D2 = N/a2 is the
density of goods (assumed to be uniform here).2
• An effective social influence parameter characterizing, in the building
of the attractiveness, the strength of the social influence term compared to
the intrinsic attractiveness:
η ≡ γ
ω 〈A0〉 (14)
where the brackets 〈.〉 denote (here and in what follows) the spatial average
over the city,
〈A0〉 ≡ 1
L2
∑
X∈Ω
A0(X). (15)
2Remark: for the multi-agent simulations it is convenient to define quantities per loca-
tion, whereas for the mathematical analysis with continuous limits, we consider densities.
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The origin of this parameter η can be understood by looking at the dynamics
(17) and noting that the maximum possible value of vk>(X, t) is controlled
by the incoming rate, Γ.
The analysis done in this paper is for an arbitrary choice of A0, and
specified for particular cases, as previously explained.
What really matters in the present model are (1) the size of the domain
over which A0 is significantly non-zero (determining the part of the city on
which transactions concentrate (see the Appendix, section A.3)), and (2) the
spatial heterogeneity in A0 values. This shows up in the results of the follow-
ing analysis of the stationary regime, where variables are found to depend
on ratios such as A
0(X)
〈A0〉 or
A0max
〈A0〉 .
As already mentioned, different social preferences could be studied, by
appropriate choice of the social term Φk(X, t). In particular, all the results
in this paper straightforwardly generalize to the case where the agents weight
higher categories differently:
Φk(X, t) = 
∑
k′≥k
wk′−k vk′(X, t) (16)
with weights wj ≥ 0 (see in particular the Appendix, Sections A.1 and A.4).
Finally, we note that the other parameters are “harmless”, that is their
values are not essential in controlling the model behaviour, provided they sat-
isfy some global condition such as being ’small’ or ’large’: the time scale δt
(small in the mathematical analysis); the number of locations L2, assumed
to be large; the (large) city size D (or equivalently the small space scale
a = D/L between two nearby locations); the number K of WTP categories
(arbitrary, but it may be convenient to consider the large K limit as provid-
ing a fine discretization of any continuous distribution of incomes); the set
of WTP values (the Pks) and the price parameters (P
0, P 1, β), which can
be chosen so as to set price scales for comparison with any given empirical
data; the total number N of goods in the city, with a number per location,
N = N /L2, assumed to be large in the mathematical analysis; the parameter
λ entering the probability to choose a location, Eq. (9), assumed to be small
(compared to the typical values of attractiveness), in which case it plays no
role, except for providing smoothness properties with occasionally extremely
high values of attractiveness.
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Section 4 now mathematically characterizes the stationary regime that
can be reached for a large range of parameter values.
4. Theoretical analysis: dynamics and equilibrium
4.1. Continuous time dynamics
For the mathematical analysis, the evolution of the above agent-based
model is further formalized through partial differential equations, taking the
continuous time limit (that is δt→ 0).
In this continuous limit, the updating rule of the attractiveness Ak(X, t)
of a location X seen by a k-agent, Equ. (3), gives:
∂tAk(X, t) = ω (A
0(X)− Ak(X, t)) +  vk>(X, t) (17)
Given the outgoing rate α (the fraction of agents leaving the inside per
unit of time), and vk(X, t) being the density of newly-housed k-agents, the
density of insiders with willingness to pay Pk, uk(X, t), satisfies the following
differential equation:
(1− α)∂tuk(X, t) = vk(X, t)− αuk(X, t) (18)
The density of outsiders ρk(X, t) is written as:
ρk(X, t) = vk(X, t) + v¯k(X, t), (19)
with v¯k(X, t) denoting the density of agents who did not succeed in buying a
good at location X and time t. Given the rules of the dynamics, the evolution
of the density of outsiders ρk(X, t) can then be written as:
∂tρk(X, t) = −ρk(X, t) + γ
K
L2 pik(X, t) + pik(X, t)
∑
X′∈Ω
v¯k(X
′, t) (20)
In the above equation, Γ
K
pik(X, t) is the rate at which new buyers visit X at
time t,
pik(X, t) being given by (9). The last term on the right-hand side of (20)
is the fraction of agents, among those who did not buy a good at time t, who
decided to search for a flat at location X. Remark: note that the scaling
gives a well-defined limit as a→ 0:
∂tρk(X, t) = −ρk(X, t) + Γ
K
fk(X, t) + fk(X, t)
∫
v¯k(X, t) d
2X (21)
where fk(X, t) = pik(X, t)/a
2 is the probability density.
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4.2. Equilibrium
4.2.1. Stationary state
We define the equilibrium as the stationary state (whenever it exists) of
the dynamics, i.e., the variables of the model - ρk(X, t), Ak(X, t), uk(X, t)
and vk(X, t) - become constant in time. All the variables in the stationary
state are denoted with an asterisk ∗.
Writing ∂tuk = 0, ∂tAk = 0 and ∂tρk = 0, in equations (18), (17) and
(20) respectively, we obtain for the stationary state:
v∗k(X) = αu
∗
k(X), (22)
A∗k(X) = A
0(X) +

ω
v∗k>(X) (23)
ρ∗k(X) = pi
∗
k(X)
∑
X′∈Ω
ρ∗k(X
′). (24)
with
pi∗k(X) =
1− exp(−λA∗k(X))∑
X′∈Ω 1− exp(−λA∗k(X ′))
(25)
or, in the small λ limit (see (10),
pi∗k(X) =
A∗k(X)
L2〈A∗k〉
(26)
with 〈A∗k〉 = (1/L2)
∑
X′∈Ω A
∗
k(X
′).
Summing equation (20) on the whole space, we conclude that:
1
L2
∑
X∈Ω
v∗k(X) = α
1
L2
∑
X∈Ω
u∗k(X) =
γ
K
. (27)
Consequently, in the stationary state, the mean density of k-housed agents
on the whole space is equal to γ
αK
. The total rate of k-transactions is γ
K
.
Thus, the total number of housed agents is the same for all the k values.
In the following, we restrict the analysis to equilibria in a non-saturated
regime, as defined below.
Definition: non-saturated equilibrium. A non-saturated equilibrium
is defined as an equilibrium where, for any given k ∈ {0, ..., K − 1}, at any
location X ∈ Ω, either the WTP of the k-agents are too low, so that none of
them can buy a dwelling in this location, hence v∗k(X) = 0, or the k-agents
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can afford to buy in this location, and in this case all k-demand is satisfied,
that is:
v¯∗k(X) = 0. (28)
We denote by Ωk the sub-set of locations X where all the k-agents’ de-
mand is satisfied:
Ωk ≡ {X ∈ Ω|v¯∗k(X) = 0} (29)
Ωk is the set of locations (possibly empty, possibly identical to Ω) where the
k-agents are able to buy homes, and the complement set, Ω \ Ωk, is the set
of locations where they cannot.
In what follows, the step-by-step analysis of the non-saturated equilibrium
implies the unicity of such an equilibrium, whenever it exists. The existence
conditions on the parameter values are the condition on the ratio of incoming
to outgoing rates compared to the number of available goods (see Section 3),
the criterion (12), and the conditions discussed in Section 5.2 concerning the
offer and demand prices. As shown in Section 6, the above definition defines
an equilibrium which is a fairly good approximation of what is observed in the
numerical simulations. Results would be different on a market with rationing
(saturated case), as we will explain later.
4.2.2. The conditions of segregation emergence: the WTP threshold
If the fraction of housed k-agents corresponds to the fraction of k-agents
in the external reservoir and the (k-independent) intrinsic attractiveness, it
means that no segregation has emerged from the market dynamics. Let us
now characterize the subsets Ωk of location possibilities for each category of
k-agents. The agents with the highest WTPs have access to any location, so
that for them, Ωk = Ω. If a k-agent can afford a good at a given location, it is
clear that k′-agents with Pk′ > Pk can as well: we must have Ωk ⊆ Ωk+1 ⊆ Ω.
Hence, in a stationary regime, either Ωk = Ω for every k (in which case there
is no segregation), or there exists a critical value k¯ such that for k < k¯, the
demand of the k-agents is not satisfied on some of the locations, Ωk ⊂ Ω
(and thus some socio-spatial segregation occurs). This means equivalently
that there is a WTP threshold P ∗c = Pk¯ so that only agents with WTP at
least equal to this threshold can buy a good anywhere in the city.
Section 5 below sets out the existence conditions of such a WTP threshold
P ∗c associated with a critical category k¯, together with the characterization
of the set Ωk of locations where the k−agents with k < k¯ can afford to buy
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a good. We first determine the densities of housed agents in a non-saturated
equilibrium whenever k¯ ≤ K − 1, distinguishing between categories above
the threshold, k ≥ k¯, and categories below the threshold, k < k¯.
4.2.3. Housed densities
For a non-saturated equilibrium, we determine the density of housed
agents in terms of the intrinsic attractiveness and of the sets Ωk introduced
above. We consider here the small λ limit: we take (26) for the probability
of choosing a location.
Proposition: In a non-saturated equilibrium, whenever P ∗c ≤ PK−1,
that is k¯ ≤ K − 1:
• for any WTP level k ≥ k¯, the density of housed k-agents does not
depend on the WTP level, but only on the intrinsic attractiveness of
the location, according to:
∀k ≥ k¯ ∀X ∈ Ω, u∗k(X) =
γ
Kα
A0(X)
〈A0〉 (30)
where 〈A0〉 is the average of A0 as defined in (15).
• if k¯ > 0 (that is P ∗c > P0), for any WTP category 0 ≤ k < k¯, that
is with Pk smaller than the WTP threshold P
∗
c , the density of housed
k-agents depends on the intrinsic attractiveness of the location and on
the set Ωk ⊂ Ω of locations in which the k-agents can afford to buy a
good, according to:
u∗k(X) =
γ
Kα
A0(X)
〈A0〉k if X ∈ Ωk (31)
= 0 otherwise (32)
with
〈A0〉k ≡ 1
L2
∑
X′∈Ωk
A0(X ′). (33)
The proof of this Proposition, demonstrated by recurrence on k start-
ing from the highest WTP value, is given in the Appendix, Section A.1.
This Proposition can also be shown to apply when the agents weight higher
categories differently, as in Eq. (16).
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Eq. (30) shows that for agents with high enough WTP (k > k¯), the social
influence parameter does not show up in the number of housed agents. An
intuitive explanation is that in a non-saturated regime, for “rich” agents not
constrained by their income, the probability of settling at a given location
depends on the attractiveness of this location relative to that of all the other
locations.
Eq. (31) is an intuitive generalization of Eq. (30): the normalization,
that is the denominator in (31), is given by the sum of A0 over locations
where the considered k-agents can locate. For k ≥ k¯, by definition Ωk = Ω,
and (31) reduces to (30).
5. Thresholds and segregation
Let us now determine the conditions for having the WTP thresholds
within the range [P0, PK−1], i.e., determine where people can be housed
depending on their WTP category. In other words, let us characterize the
sets Ωk.
The absence of segregation in the stationary regime would mean that,
at any location, there are transactions involving any WTP category. If, on
the contrary, at some locations the market dynamics make the distribution
of offer prices higher than the distribution of demand prices, the poorest
people cannot be housed, and thus some segregation occurs. In the worst
case, the offer prices become so high that the intersection between the two
distributions is null: this would mean that the system does not settle in a
stationary state, but reaches a “frozen” state where housed agents cannot
sell their good to any other agent. We determine here the conditions on
the parameters that separate the regime with non-segregated equilibrium
from the one with segregated equilibrium, and the regime with segregated
equilibrium from the frozen state. This will also determine the thresholds in
the intermediate parameter regime where segregation occurs.
5.1. Stationarity criterion: non-profitable arbitrage
The existence of a stationary regime requires the absence of profitable ar-
bitrage. Indeed, if at a given location, all the poorest inhabitants were selling
their goods with a positive profit, this lowest category of income would even-
tually disappear from this location. We thus write the stationarity condition,
in other words, at each location, for each WTP level k present in this loca-
tion, the condition for the realization of transactions between two agents of
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the same category. From the definition of the offer prices, Eq. (5), we get
the condition Pk ≥ P 0 + (1− exp(−ξA¯∗(X)))Pk, which we can write as:
ξA¯∗(X) ≤ log Pk
P 0
(34)
where we recall that A¯∗(X) = 1
K
∑
k A
∗
k(X). As explained below, this condi-
tion enables us to identify the WTP category threshold k¯.
5.2. The frozen state
At the limit, nobody can be housed, and the attractiveness decreases
towards the intrinsic value A0. Then, a necessary condition for avoiding
the frozen state is to have the criterion (34) satisfied for the highest income
category, k = K − 1, when the attractiveness is equal to the maximum value
that can be taken by the intrinsic attractiveness. This gives the condition:
ξA0max < log
PK−1
P 0
. (35)
A frozen market could be linked to a market bubble. This sort of crisis
could be attenuated by having adaptive agents with idiosyncratic P 0 and ξ
values: in order to sell their good, agents could lower at least one of these
parameters, so that they would accept lower prices. Such a scenario would
lead to an endogenous determination of some of the parameters. This clearly
goes beyond the scope of this paper. We simply assume here that the P 0
and ξ values are the same for every agent and within a range that allows to
reach a stationary regime.
5.3. The WTP Threshold
We now write the conditions for the existence of a critical WTP level, k¯ ∈
{1, ..., K − 1}. Assuming that such a threshold exists, we get the expression
of A¯∗(X) (see the Appendix, Section A.2):
A¯∗(X) = A0(X)
(
1 +
η
2
[
K + 1
K
− (k¯ + 1)k¯
K2
]
)
(36)
where η = γ
ω 〈A0〉 , as defined in (14). The category threshold k¯, and the
associated WTP threshold P ∗c = Pk¯, are obtained by writing the inequality
(34) for locations X where A0 reaches its maximum value, A0max:
ξ A0max
(
1 +
η
2
[
K + 1
K
− (k + 1)k
K2
]
)
≤ ln Pk
P 0
(37)
and k¯ is the smallest value of k for which this inequality is true.
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Large K limit. For illustrative purposes, let us here assume that the WTP
values are evenly distributed between two extreme values, according to Eq. (1),
that is Pk = P0 + ∆
k
K−1 , k = 0, ..., K − 1 (see the Appendix, Section A.4,
for the case of an arbitrary distribution). In the large K limit, writing that
the threshold corresponds to the marginal case where the inequality becomes
an equality, we obtain the WTP threshold P ∗c as the solution of:
log
P ∗c
P 0
− ξ˜ = η ξ˜
2
(
1−
(
P ∗c − P0
∆
)2)
(38)
where ξ˜ = ξA0max, as defined by Eq. (11) Section 3, is the effective parameter
controlling the attractiveness dependency of the offer prices.
Since η = γ
ω 〈A0〉 , as defined in (14), note that the product ηξ˜ on the
right-hand side of (38) combines five key control parameters (see Section 3):
the inflow of agents γ, the social strength , the relaxation time scale 1/ω,
the offer prices parameter ξ, and a measure of the heterogeneity of intrinsic
attractiveness, 〈A0〉/A0max.
5.4. The emergence of segregation
Let us study the existence and solutions of Eq. (38). Analysis of the
equation shows that there are three parameter regimes to consider, as detailed
below.
• First, there is no solution for ξ˜ > log(PK−1/P 0): this corresponds to
the frozen state, where no transactions occur.
• Second, there exists a parameter domain where segregation occurs even
in the absence of social influence. This is the case for logP0/P
0 < ξ˜ ≤
log(PK−1/P 0). In this case, a solution exists defining a critical threshold
larger than P0. Such a condition on the parameters is reached for large
enough values of ξ˜, that is if the offer prices are high, even if this is only due
to the intrinsic attractiveness. For large values of ξ˜, Eq. (5) implies that the
offer prices do not even depend on the attractiveness: P ok = P
0 + Pk.
• The third case corresponds to ξ˜ < logP0/P 0, illustrated in Fig. 1. As
the figure shows, and as one can verify in Eq. (38), the threshold P ∗c is an
increasing function of η. This means that P ∗c increases if the social factor
 increases, or if the inflow of agents increases; whereas P ∗c decreases if the
relaxation of the attractiveness towards the intrinsic value A0 is faster (larger
ω), or if the domain of strongly attractive locations increases (larger 〈A0〉):
and this is consistent with the economic intuition.
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Figure 1: Willingness to Pay Threshold P ∗c (normalized by P0) as function of the (effective)
social strength η, illustrated for ∆/P0 = 1.25 and P
0eξA
0
max/P0 = 0.55. Segregation occurs
for η larger than the critical value ηc given by condition Pc/P0 = 1 (here ηc = 11.86).
As η goes from 0 to +∞, the critical threshold P ∗c increases from P 0eξ˜ to
P0 + ∆. There is thus a critical value ηc of η:
ηc = 2 (
1
ξ˜
log
P0
P 0
− 1) > 0, (39)
below which P ∗c is smaller than P0, and thus every agent can locate at the
center: there is no segregation. It is only when the social influence, η > ηc is
strong enough, that there exists a WTP threshold that segregates the richest
away from the others. This is one of the most important qualitative results:
the heterogeneity in A0 values is not enough to lead to income segregation; in
a non-saturated equilibrium, segregation emerges from the strengthening of
such heterogeneities, provided the strength of social influence is large enough.
For a given value of η, the condition for the emergence of segregation,
η > ηc, is a condition on the parameters P0, and P
0eξ˜, which characterize
the smallest WTP value and the smallest offer value. Note that the threshold
ηc does not depend on WTP distribution, but only on the minimum value
of WTP in the population, whereas the critical WTP value does depend on
WTP distribution.
5.5. Local and category thresholds
From the stationarity condition (34), we can also deduce for each location
X the poorest housed category kc(X) (that is the smallest value of k such that
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the k-agents are present on X), and for each category k < k¯ the maximum
intrinsic attractiveness level, A0c,k, which defines the locations X where the
k-agents can be housed: Ωk = {X|A0(X) ≤ A0c,k}.
Consider k < k¯. Since 〈A0〉k ≤ 〈A0〉, from (34) and (A-16) we obtain the
inequality:
ξ A0(X) ≤ ln
P ∗c (X)
P 0
1 + η
2
[K+1
K
− (kc(X)+1)kc(X)
K2
]
(40)
with P ∗c (X) = Pkc(X). This inequality can also be read as giving the maxi-
mum intrinsic attractiveness level A0c,k:
ξ A0c,k ≤
ln Pk
P 0
1 + η
2
[K+1
K
− (k+1)k
K2
]
(41)
Since the inequality (40) has been derived by replacing 〈A0〉k by 〈A0〉, we
expect it to be strict. We get a lower bound on kc(X) (and a lower bound on
P ∗c (X), an upper bound on A
0
c,k) by writing that the category threshold kc(X)
is the smallest value of k for which this inequality is true - in a continuous
limit, it is the marginal value for which the inequality becomes an equality.
As will be seen with the numerical simulations, these bounds are very good
approximations.
5.6. Case of a monocentric city: critical distances
Let us now apply the above results to the case of a monocentric city,
with an intrinsic attractiveness monotonically decreasing from the center.
Since the intrinsic attractiveness decreases from the center, the condition
(41) means that for each k, the restricted set Ωk is characterized by a crit-
ical distance d∗c(k) from the center, beyond which the k−agents’ demand is
positive. For illustrative purposes, let us assume A0 has a two-dimensional
Gaussian shape:
A0(X) = A0max exp
(
−D(X)
2
R2
)
(42)
where A0max is the maximum intrinsic attractiveness, D(X) is the Euclidean
distance from the center, and R determines the distance from the center at
which the intrinsic attractiveness is still significantly non-zero. Then, the
critical distance d∗c(k) satisfies:
d∗c(k) ≥ R
√√√√− ln[ 1ξA0max ln PkP 0
1 + η
2
[K+1
K
− (k+1)k
K2
]
]
(43)
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The above equation is valid whenever the argument of the logarithm is
smaller or equal to 1, and otherwise d∗c(k) = 0. This is the case for all k
levels above the WTP threshold, and the critical WTP level k¯ is the smallest
value of k for which d∗c(k) = 0. The distance d
∗
c(k¯ − 1) > 0 gives the limit of
the central domain where only the richest can buy a dwelling.
5.7. Summary
Let us briefly summarize the main results of this section and comment on
the consequences in terms of space organization (social mix or segregation).
For the stationary state, we have shown that if and only if the social influence
is strong enough, there emerges a WTP threshold which segregates the richest
from the others. The spatial distribution of agents with a willingness to pay
higher than this critical value does not depend on the individual income level
but only on the intrinsic attractiveness of the locations. In other words, there
is a social mix between agents with an income above the WTP threshold.
Agents with income below this threshold can only buy goods in a restricted
set of locations, which depends both on the intrinsic attractiveness and on
their income. In such locations, however, some social mix remains.
6. Numerical simulations
We now simulate the agent-based model as presented in Section 2, illus-
trating the theoretical results in the case of a pure monocentric city.
6.1. Simulation specifications
Following the rationale presented in Section 3, the model parameters are
chosen as follows. We consider a square lattice of linear size L = 100, hence
with L × L = 10000 sites (locations). Each location X is characterized by
its Cartesian coordinates (x, y) in the frame whose origin is the center of the
square lattice. Without loss of generality, time and space scales are arbitrarily
given by the time step δt = 1 and the lattice spacing a = 1 respectively. The
intrinsic attractiveness A0(X) is chosen to decrease with the distance from
the center, as in (42): we express it as a two-dimensional Gaussian function,
A0(X) = A0max exp(−
D(X)2
R2
) (44)
where A0max is the maximum intrinsic attractiveness, D(X) = (x
2 + y2)1/2 is
the distance from the center, and R determines the distance from the center
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at which the intrinsic attractiveness is still significant. We set A0max = 1 and
R = 10.
Most simulations are driven with K = 10 categories, but we also present
some results for K = 50, which is large enough for comparison with the theo-
retical results obtained in the large K limit. The total number N of goods at
each location is set equal to 200. This is large enough to prevent the system
from saturating, i.e., to avoid having the number of assets for sale falling to
0 on some sites.
The WTP values are set following Eq. (1), with P0 = 10
5 and ∆ = 225000.
The offer price parameters are P 0 = 9x104, P 1 = 2x105 and ξ = 0.1.
The other parameters are: the outgoing rate α = 0.1, the inflow Γ
K
= 1000,
the social influence strength  = 0.022, the attractiveness relaxation constant
ω = 1
15
, the transaction price parameter β = 0.1, and finally λ = 0.01.
With these parameter values, the effective social strength parameter is η =
10.504 for K = 10, and η = 52.521 for K = 50. In both cases, the critical
value as given by Eq. (39) is ηc = 0.107, so that segregation is expected to
occur. Finally, if one considers the distance unit as km and the price unit as
euro, the results are of the same order of magnitude as what we observe for
the Paris market (this is discussed in more detail in the next section).
The agent-based dynamics, detailed in Section 2.7,
is briefly recalled here. At t = 0, the simulated city is empty, and the ini-
tial attractiveness of a location X seen by every k-agent is set to the intrinsic
attractiveness: Ak(X, t = 0) = A
0(X). At each time step, a randomly chosen
fraction α of housed agents put their good on the market. On the demand
side, a number Γ/K of new k-agents arrive from the external reservoir and
join the agents who failed to buy at the previous time step, if any. Every
one of these agents chooses a location X where he would like to buy, the
choice depending on the attractiveness of the locations according to Eq. (9).
In each location, available offers are sold according to the chosen matching
rule. Two sets of simulations are done, testing two versions of the matching
rule (see Section 2.7):
(a) the goods are sold in a random order, meaning that one buyer is picked
at random for a randomly-chosen offer, then another buyer is picked a
random for a second randomly-chosen offer, and so on.
(b) the goods are sold in order of increasing offer price, meaning a buyer
is picked at random for the least expensive offer, then a second buyer
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is picked at random for the second least expensive offer, and so on.
Once all the transactions have been completed, the attractiveness is up-
dated according to Eq. (3). The process is repeated until a stationary regime
is reached.
In all cases, we find that the system reaches a stationary state character-
ized by a constant number of housed agents on the lattice. In what follows,
we analyze these stationary states. Focusing on the income and space distri-
bution of housed agents, we compare the results of the numerical simulations
with the results of the theoretical analysis when the matching rule is rule
(a).
6.2. Price distribution
Once a stationary regime has been reached, we measure the mean trans-
action prices and the associated variances. For the price distributions, we
find no noticeable differences when rule (a) or rule (b) is selected, and Fig. 2
presents the results for rule (a). As expected from the theoretical results,
transaction prices decrease from the center to the periphery (Fig. 2, left).
Looking at the standard deviations (Fig. 2, middle), we can distinguish two
parts: in the city center, a large distribution of the prices shows an active
dynamics, whereas in the near peripheral area, we observe a trend towards
price homogenization. The interesting fact that prices present a larger vari-
ance in the central area than at the periphery, i.e., the variance is higher for
higher mean prices (Fig. 2, right), is consistent with the theoretical analysis
in Section 4.2: in locations where only the richest can afford to buy a good,
there is no segregation amongst these rich agents. Hence there is a large
variation of transaction prices in these locations.
6.3. Socio-spatial segregation and income mix
Fig. 3 shows the occupancy ratio for the different WTP in the stationary
state with respect to the distance from the center. People are located inside
the zone where the intrinsic attractiveness is significantly non-zero, in keeping
with the analysis of Section A.3.
Figure 3 compares the distribution of housed people with two different
search rules: in case (a), the density of k-agents excluded from the center
jumps discontinuously to a non-zero value at a critical distance from the
center, whereas in case (b), the transition is smoother. However, the overall
distribution is the same, confirming the theoretical predictions obtained for
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Figure 2: Left: average prices (euros) as a function of the distance from the center, for
K=50: the analytical result (solid curve) fits the numerical simulations (dashed curve)
well. Middle: standard deviation of transaction prices (euros) versus distance from the
center; Right: standard deviation of transaction prices versus mean transaction prices
(thousands of euros). The straight lines are linear regressions: (low prices) slope 0.9,
intercept −62.000 correlation coeff. −1.0; (large prices) slope 0.1, intercept −2.000, cor-
relation coeff. −0.97.
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Figure 3: Occupancy ratio per WTP versus the distance from the center in the stationary
state. K = 10 income categories are present on the lattice. The distance from the center
is in arbitrary units. The offers to be sold are randomly chosen (case (a), right panel), or
in order of increasing prices (case (b), left panel).
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Figure 4: Critical distance with respect to the WTP category k (K = 50): the points are
obtained from the simulations, the solid curve is the analytical bound (the right-hand side
of (43)).
case (a): two zones of segregation, the rich and the poor, and in between an
intermediary zone with some social mix.
The critical WTP value k¯ is found to be around 15, and the agents with
a lower WTP are distinguished by their income: the lower the WTP, the
higher the distance from the center. Fig. 4 shows how the critical distance
increases as the WTP level decreases. Fig. 5 represents the number of agents
housed in a given area, on the left for one category of rich agents, and on the
right for one category of poor agents. Both figures exhibit a good correlation
between the analytical results and the numerical simulations.
To summarize, when the offers are randomly selected - rule (a) -, the
numerical results fit the non-saturated equilibrium defined in the analytical
part: at some distance specific to the agent’s WTP, one has a sharp transition
from no housing (v(X) = 0) to complete housing (all potential buyers become
housed, v¯(X) = 0). In the case where the less expensive assets are sold first
- rule (b) -, there exists a small domain of locations where both v(X) and
v¯(X) are non-null. We recall, however, that for the distribution of transaction
prices, the two rules give the same results.
6.4. Social mix index
Now we will use quantitative measures of segregation to estimate the
level of social diversity. There is a large literature on such measures: here we
consider two measures particularly adapted to our study. First, we introduce
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Figure 5: Mean number of housed agents with respect to the distance from the center
(K = 10). Left: for rich agents (income level k = 9). Right: for poor people (income level
k = 2). The solid curves correspond to the simulations, while the dotted ones are from
the theoretical analysis: Left, Equ. (30), right: Eq. (31), with d∗c(k) replaced by its lower
bound, the right-hand side of (43).
a multigroup social mix index derived from the mean relative deviation index
proposed by Reardon & Firebaugh (2002):
ID(X) =
K−1∑
k=0
|νk(X)− 1
K
| (45)
where νk(X) is the relative density of k-agents:
νk(X) ≡ uk(X)∑K−1
k′=0 uk′(X)
(46)
This gives the difference between the uniform distribution and the observed
distribution: the larger this index, the greater the segregation at this location.
Second, we use the entropy (or Shannon information) associated with the
income distribution at each location as a measure of segregation.
H(X) = −
K−1∑
k=0
νk(X) log νk(X). (47)
The larger the entropy, the weaker the segregation (with a maximum possible
value of H = logK when all categories are equally present, and with H = 0
as the minimum value when a single category is found at the considered loca-
tion). The entropy has unique mathematical properties that are appropriate
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for a measure of heterogeneity3 - for a discussion in the economics context,
see Theil (1967).
In contrast to most of the literature, we do not consider averages of the
indices over all the spatial locations (the social mix index ID(X) and the
entropy H(X) are defined for each location X). To quantify the segregation
as a function of the distance from the center, we consider the averages of
the indices ID and H over locations situated at a same distance from the
center. Figure 6 shows theses average values, comparing two different rates
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Figure 6: Social mix index ID (left) and Entropy H(X) (right), as functions of the distance
f,om the center, with K = 10, for two rates of newcomers γ1 = 1 (that is Γ/K = 1000)
and γ2 = 3. Other parameters as for the other simulations.
of newcomers, γ1 < γ2.
The plots quantify what we inferred from Fig. 3: there is a zone near the
city center with a moderate value of each index, a peripheral zone with a
high index (low entropy), and an intermediate zone with a weak index (high
entropy). This confirms the presence of an intermediate area of social mix.
We also see that when we increase the rate of newcomers and hence the local
demand, the index (resp. entropy) is on the whole higher (resp. lower),
meaning there is a general decline in the social mix. The domain of social
mix becomes smaller, and income segregation is thus amplified.
3In particular, it allows the coherent study of segregation at different scales e.g. if one
wants to see how the measure changes when increasing the number of income categories.
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6.5. Saturated regime
Increasing the incoming rate further eventually leads to a saturated state,
i.e., with a situation of excess demand at some locations. An example is
illustrated in Fig. 7. The parameters of the simulations are the same as
before, except for the rate of newcomers which is higher. Comparing with
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Figure 7: Saturated stationary regime: occupancy ratio per WTP versus the distance
from the center (in arbitrary units). The parameters of the simulations are the same as
in Fig. 3 except for Γ/K = 2000.
Fig. 3, we see that saturation increases the critical distances for the low WTP
agents: the poorer agents move further away from the center.
The analytical expressions derived previously do not hold in this saturated
case, for which the mathematical analysis requires a specific study beyond
the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, the simulations indicate that
the distribution of the population exhibits similar features to those obtained
in the non-saturated case, with increased income segregation.
7. Application to the Paris housing market
This section proposes a first comparison between the results of the model
- analytically demonstrated and validated by simulations - and empirical
observations. The aim here is to see how far the price distribution in Paris
can be explained by the phenomena described above.
7.1. The empirical database
The main reliable information source on real-estate prices in Paris is the
B.I.E.N. database, managed by the ”Chambre des Notaires de Paris”, which
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records real-estate transactions for Paris and the Ile-de-France region. This
database covers all categories of real estate, indicating, for each transaction,
more than 100 different elements of information drawn from the associated
legal documents. For our study, we extract the information we need, con-
cerning the locations and transaction prices for flats. Since the data base
contains information from 1990 until 2004, the long term dynamics may be
studied: this will be the subject of future works, requiring additional features
in the model, notably the introduction of a slow dynamics for the intrinsic
attractiveness. In the present work we restrict the analysis to one particular
year, namely 1994, for which the number of registered transactions is large
enough. Moreover, this is an important year because it is situated before the
fall in prices which affected Paris from 1995 to 2000.
During the year 1994, about 13000 transactions were recorded in Paris.
The average price of a flat was 143300 euros, the standard deviation was
around 90000 euros and the distribution was not normal (the normalized
kurtosis coefficient is strictly positive). Since the database does not contain
the incomes of the buyers, we use the transaction prices as a proxy for income
distributions.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 give some idea of the spatial distribution of prices
in Paris. Paris is not a very large city, and its geometrical form (’like a
potato’) endows the geographical center, identified as the historical center
Notre-Dame de Paris, with particular importance. Looking at the map of
the prices in Fig. 8, a first obvious fact is that prices are high in the center,
with a marked trend of decreasing prices as one moves away from the center.
Hence, the monocentric model could be seen as a first-order approximation
of the Paris market. However, there are obvious deviations from this general
trend. In particular, the ”Rive Gauche” effect is important: at a similar
distance from the centre, prices are higher on the left bank than on the right.
In addition, prices are high in the 16th arrondissement on the very outskirts
of Paris, creating a “hot-spot” of high prices far from the center. This map
is obtained by averaging transaction prices over areas of 500 by 500 meters.
In Fig. 9, standard deviations are plotted with respect to the correspond-
ing average prices used in Fig. 8, for each of the areas that contain enough
transactions for the measure to be relevant. As expected, the standard de-
viation grows with the prices, suggesting a higher diversity when prices are
high. However, it should be noted that the standard deviation is an affine
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Figure 8: Transaction prices in Paris in the year 1994.
function of the average price.4 This behaviour is remarkably similar to that
obtained in the model, both qualitatively and quantitatively: compare the
plot in Fig. 9 with Fig. 2, right (case of the modeled monocentric city), and
the linear regression slopes in both cases.
7.2. Data-driven modeling
As explained above, a simple monocentric model would not allow to fit the
price distribution in Paris. Here we simulate the Paris prices by considering
a more specific model of the city, which combines a general preference for the
center together with preferences for some local particularities.
First, instead of using a square lattice in the simulations, we use a stylized
map of Paris. It consists of three concentric zones of radius R1,R2,R3, each
zone with 4,7 and 9 areas respectively representing the arrondissements, and
the ratios of the simulated areas fitting the real ratios well. The stylized map
of Paris is presented on the left of Fig. 10. Second, we assign to each one of
these “arrondissements” a specific intrinsic attractiveness, decreasing with
distance from the city center.
4This observation would have been less evident had we normalize the standard deviation
by the mean.
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Figure 9: Paris data. Standard deviation versus transaction prices in thousands of euros.
The straight line is the corresponding linear regression: slope 0.091, intercept −3.482,
correlation coeff. −0.972.
For each arrondissement in the model, the intrinsic attractiveness param-
eters are scaled according to the average transaction price of the correspond-
ing (real) arrondissement in the year 1994. More precisely, the maximum
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Figure 10: On the left: stylized map of Paris. On the right: map of the intrinsic attrac-
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attractiveness is taken as the ratio of the squared mean transaction price in
the arrondissement studied to the squared maximum mean transaction price
observed among all the arrondissements. Finally, the intrinsic attractiveness
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A0,a of each arrondissement a = 1, ..., 20 is given by:
A0,a(X) =
(
P aref
Pmaxref
)2
exp
(
− (R
a −D(X))2
R2
)
(48)
where D(X) is the distance from the center, Ra the shortest distance from
the arrondissement to the center (which can take one of the three values,
R1, R2, R3), and P
a
ref the mean transaction price of the arrondissement cal-
culated for the year 1994. The value of R is chosen to be of the same order
of magnitude as the mean distance to the center of the lattice. The resulting
map of the intrinsic attractiveness is presented in the right-hand panel of
Fig. 10.
Note that firstly, the above form and parametrization of the attractiveness
gives a stronger attractiveness to the more expensive arrondissements, even if
they are far from the center of the city, and secondly, the chosen calibration
only provides the overall price trend of the arrondissements - it does not
determine how the prices vary within a given arrondissement.
For the year 1994, we order the transaction prices and divide the price
domain into intervals such that each one includes about 1000 transaction
prices. We postulate that prices belonging to a same price interval correspond
to transactions made by individuals belonging to a same income class. In
the model, each of these intervals is thus associated with one WTP category.
This gives K = 13 WTP levels in the model.
According to data published by the INSEE (the French National Institute
of Statistics and Economic Studies), there are about 375000 home-owners in
Paris (we only consider main residences), and about 13000 transactions in
one year. We therefore deduce a rate of house-moving of about 3.5%, hence
α = 0.035. Lastly, we take Γ
K
= 1000,  = 0.18, R = 10, λ = 0.005,
ξ = 0.05, ∆ = 225000, β = 0.1, P 0 = 90000, and P0 = 100000. Assuming
the price unit to be the euro, this set of parameter values allows us to obtain
transaction prices of the same order as the empirical prices.
Arrondissement-specific segregation. When applied to the present case, the
general theoretical results predict the emergence of segregation with critical
distances specific to each arrondissement. The space is here decomposed
into the union of m = 20 disjoint sub-spaces (arrondissements) Ωa, a =
1, ...,m, such that, on each of these sub-spaces, the intrinsic attractiveness is
continuous and monotonically decreasing with the distance from the center
of the city.
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Each Ωk (the subset of locations to which k-agents have access) is then
the union of sub-sets Ωak, where the agents have a sufficiently high WTP to
exchange, Ωk =
⋃m
a=1 Ω
a
k with
Ωak ≡ {X ∈ Ωa|D(X) ≥ dac(k)} (49)
where dac(k) gives the critical distance specific to the sub-set Ω
a
k: for each
space Ωa, the k−agents can afford the goods in the locations X ∈ Ωa for
which D(X) ≥ dac(k). Similarly, a WTP threshold P ∗,ac can be defined for
each arrondissement. The agents with a WTP above the threshold of a given
arrondissement can buy a good in any location in this arrondissement. The
WTP threshold, P ∗c , on the whole city is given by P
∗
c = maxa(P
∗,a
c ).
Figure 11 shows two different measures of the segregation within the
(real and the simulated) city of Paris. On the left, we present the degrees of
exclusion for different levels of income as obtained from simulations with 50
income levels. Clearly, when the poorest people (income level 0) are not able
to buy a dwelling in Paris, the richest ones (income level 45) can live just
about wherever they want. It is also interesting to note that, even for a low
level of income (income level 9 for example), there exist some opportunities
to live in the expensive arrondissements. On the right-hand side of the
figure, the social mix index (defined in Eq. 45 in Section 6.4) obtained in
the simulations is compared with the one computed from real data, with
transaction price being used as a proxy for income. The patterns are clearly
similar, confirming the pertinence of our model for explaining prices in Paris.
In particular, the lowest levels of social diversity (corresponding to the
highest values of the social mix index) are observed in the 8th,16th,18th,19th
and 20th arrondissements, both in the simulations and in the data: the 8th
and the 16th are the arrondissements where people’s incomes are above the
threshold, while the 18th, 19th and 20th arrondissements are the poorest.
8. Conclusion
Going beyond the simple Schelling segregation model, this paper studies
social segregation through the spatial distribution of income resulting from
dynamic price formation and agents’ localization in a particular housing mar-
ket model. In doing so, it actually introduces a new general framework for
studying such markets and the resulting socio-spatial segregation. A specific
feature of the model is the specification of the attractiveness of each location,
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Figure 11: Left: for different WTP categories, the degree of exclusion from each arrondisse-
ment, measured by the percentage of arrondissement area where the considered category
cannot buy a home (results from simulations with K = 50). Right: social mix index
computed for the empirical data (points) and simulations (curve).
composed of both an intrinsic part and a subjective part that depends on
the agents’ social preferences and therefore evolves over time with the social
characteristics of each neighborhood.
For the particular choices made in the present study - a preference for
neighbors with similar or higher incomes -, the analysis of a non-saturated
market yields the following main results. First, as expected, for a wide range
of parameters, a socio-spatial segregation occurs, with richer people living
in locations with higher intrinsic attractiveness. Second, such segregation
occurs only if social influence is strong enough: on its own, the heterogeneity
in attractiveness is not enough to provoke segregation. Third, and more
original, whenever socio-spatial segregation occurs, there exists a large area
of locations with intermediate values of intrinsic attractiveness where some
social diversity is preserved. Finally, we prove that segregation is due to
the emergence of income thresholds which divide the space between richer
and poorer people. This endogenous threshold varies following the dynamic
attractiveness of the rich location. This result could have important economic
implications for the regulation of the housing market. For example, a policy
aiming to boost demand (by subsidizing the poorer potential buyers) without
constraining the supply side would lead to an increase in the distribution of
sellers’ prices and thus exacerbate the segregation.
Specifying the results for the case of a monocentric city (the closer to
the center, the higher the intrinsic attractiveness), all the results can be
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simply stated in terms of properties depending on the distance from the
center. Whenever social influence is strong enough, there exists a critical
distance isolating a central zone occupied by the richest people. Within this
zone, there is no segregation between these rich agents: some are richer than
others, and this shows up in the high variance in transaction prices. Poorer
people find themselves on the outskirts, where social diversity is the weakest,
leading to a low variance in transaction prices. At intermediate distances
from the center, there is an area of moderate social mix.
Looking at the empirical distribution of prices in Paris for the year 1994,
we observe that, as a first-order approximation, the simple Alonso model
(prices higher at the center) is a good description: higher prices are indeed
concentrated around Notre Dame cathedral. The behavior of the mean and
standard deviation of price transactions with the distance from the center
are fairly well reproduced by the model. However, this monocentric charac-
terization of the housing market in Paris is only correct on average; it misses
certain particularities, such as the difference between prices on the left bank
(higher) and the right bank (lower). A better representation of the Paris
housing market is then proposed by considering an intrinsic attractiveness
specific to each of the 20 arrondissements of Paris. Taking the spatial distri-
bution of transaction prices as a proxy for the spatial distribution of income,
the results compare favorably with empirical data in the distinction between
arrondissements : a low level of social diversity corresponds to arrondisse-
ments with either the highest or the lowest average prices, and a lower level
segregation corresponds to arrondissements with intermediate average prices.
The mathematical analysis is limited to a non-saturated regime, as ex-
plained in Section 4.2.1. On the technical side, this allows for a complete
mathematical characterization of the stationary states. On the qualitative
side, it demonstrates that heterogeneity in intrinsic attractiveness alone is
not enough to provoke segregation, which only emerges when the social in-
fluence is strong enough. Analytical study of the saturated regime - briefly
explored numerically in Section 6.5 - will require a much more complex anal-
ysis, beyond the scope of the present paper. The present model provides a
framework that is general enough to take into account other components of
social preferences such as ethnic features or other population characteristics.
This study also allows for further investigations. Concerning social pref-
erences, alternative hypotheses such as agents preferring to live in more
working-class areas have yet to be considered. Preliminary results indi-
cate that a preference to live with poorer neighbors has opposite effects to
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those shown in the present paper, working against the emergence of segre-
gation. Concerning the dynamics of the model, the long-term evolution will
be studied by introducing a slow dynamics for the intrinsic attractiveness,
corresponding to the effect of, e.g., investments in new amenities, or, on the
contrary, the deterioration of a neighborhood. This should also allow for the
analysis of the emergence of polycentric cities. A further step would consist
in analyzing the conditions on the dynamics of subjective attractiveness for
the emergence of “hot spots” - local areas of high prices unrelated to the level
of intrinsic attractiveness. This could accompany extensions to the model,
notably in the line of Short et al. (2008) and Berestycki & Nadal (2010),
adding a diffusion term to the attractiveness dynamics: high attractiveness
of a location is expected to have some positive influence on the attractive-
ness of nearby locations. It is this kind of extension that is likely to lead
to dynamical instabilities, with the emergence of hot spots of high prices,
that could, for example, explain changes in the ranking of arrondissements
by property prices over the years. The study of these dynamical instabilities
could provide new insights into the mechanisms behind gentrification.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of the Proposition, Section 4.2.3
We give here the proof by recurrence on k.
Proof: case k ≥ k¯.
At equilibrium, u∗k(X) =
v∗k(X)
α
=
ρ∗k(X)
α
which gives:
u∗k(X) =
γ
Kα
A∗k(X)
(1/L2)Zk
(A-1)
with
Zk ≡
∑
X∈Ω
A∗k(X) (A-2)
From the fixed point equations, we get, for any k ∈ {0, ..., K − 1},
Zk = Z
0 +

ω
∑
X∈Ω
∑
k′≥k
vk′(X) = Z
0 + L2
γ
ωK
(K − k) (A-3)
In particular, for the housed (K − 1)-agents (highest WTP):
u∗K−1(X) =
γ
Kα
A0(X) + α
ω
u∗K−1(X)
(1/L2)Z0 + 
ω
γ
K
(A-4)
Solving this equation leads to:
u∗K−1(X) =
γ
Kα
A0(X)
(1/L2)Z0
(A-5)
Now assume that (30) is true for k + 1 ≤ k′ ≤ K − 1 with k ≥ k¯. Then we
have:
u∗k(X) =
γ
Kα
A0(X) + α
ω
u∗k(X) + (K − k − 1) γωK A
0(X)
(1/L2)Z0
(1/L2)Z0 + γ
ωK
(K − k) (A-6)
which gives u∗k(X) =
γ
Kα
A0(X)
(1/L2)Z0
. Hence the proposition is proved by recur-
rence for all k ≥ k¯.
Proof: case k < k¯ (assuming k¯ > 0).
From (24), the density of potential buyers in a location X (outsiders) is given
by:
ρ∗k(X) =
A∗k(X)∑
X′∈Ω A
∗
k(X
′)
∑
X′∈Ω
ρ∗k(X
′) (A-7)
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For k < k¯, v∗k(X) = 0 for X ∈ Ω \Ωk, and v¯∗k(X) = 0 for X ∈ Ωk. Hence,
since ρ∗k(X) = v
∗
k(X) + v¯
∗
k(X), we have:∑
X∈Ωk
ρ∗k(X) =
∑
X∈Ωk
v∗k(X) =
∑
X∈Ω
v∗k(X) (A-8)
As we have seen, in the stationary state the total number of k-agents on the
lattice is γL
2
αK
, and v∗k(X) = αu
∗
k(X), so that finally:∑
X∈Ωk
ρ∗k(X) = L
2 γ
K
(A-9)
Then, summing Eq. (A-7) over X in Ωk, we get:
ρ∗k(X) =
γL2
K
A∗k(X)∑
X′∈Ωk A
∗
k(X
′)
(A-10)
Let us now consider k = k¯ − 1, that is the highest WTP category for which
Ωk is different from Ω, i.e., the highest k−WTP which does not allow to buy
a good anywhere. The agents with a WTP greater than Pk are distributed
according to the expression (30). Thus, if X ∈ Ωk:
ρ∗k(X) = v
∗
k(X) = αu
∗
k(X) =
γL2
K
A∗k(X)∑
X′∈Ωk A
∗
k(X
′)
(A-11)
u∗k(X) =
γL2
Kα
A0(X) + α
ω
[(K − k) L2 A0(X)∑
X′∈ΩA0(X′)
+ u∗k(X)]∑
X′∈Ωk [A
0(X ′)] + 
ω
[(K − k)γL2
K
∑
X′∈Ωk A
0(X′)∑
X′∈Ω A0(X′)
+ γL
2
K
]
(A-12)
The equation (A-12) leads to:
u∗k(X) =
γL2
Kα
A0(X)∑
X′∈Ωk A
0(X ′)
. (A-13)
By recurrence, we can generalize to any k < k¯:
v∗k(X) = αu
∗
k(X) =
γL2
K
A0(X)∑
X′∈Ωk A
0(X ′)
if X ∈ Ωk (A-14)
= 0 otherwise (A-15)
Note that the above proof can easily be shown to apply to the case where
agents weight higher categories differently, as in Eq. (16).
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A.2. Computing the mean attractiveness
Assuming k¯ ∈ {1, ..., K−1}, we obtain the expression of A¯∗(X) as follows.
From the stationary equation for A∗k, Eq.(23), and from the Proposition
stated in Section 4.2.3, we get, in a non-saturated equilibrium:
A∗k(X) = A
0(X) +
γ
ωK
∑
k′≥max(k,kc(X))
A0(X)
〈A0〉k′ (A-16)
kc(X) is the smallest value of k such that the k-agents are present on X.
First consider k ≥ k¯. In this case, 〈A0〉k = 〈A0〉 so that, from (A-16), we
get: A∗k(X) = A
0(X) + η A
0(X)
2
[1 − k
K
], where η = γ
ω 〈A0〉 , as defined in (14).
At locations X where kc(X) = k¯, for k < k¯, we obtain from (A-16) A
∗
k(X) =
A0(X)+ η A
0(X)
2
[1− k¯
K
]. As a result, the average value A¯∗(X) =
∑K−1
0 A
∗
k(X)
is
A¯∗(X) = A0(X) +
η A0(X)
2
[
K + 1
K
− (k¯ + 1)k¯
K2
] (A-17)
A.3. The residential city
The densities obtained with the partial differential equations approach
can take arbitrarily small values. In the agent-based version, the number
of agents at a given location obviously only take integer values: we can ex-
pect a good comparison considering that the actual density is zero whenever
a2 uk(X) is less than 1. For a concrete example, consider a monocentric city
with A0(X) = A0max exp(−D(X)2/R2), with R < D. The diameter Deff of
the space of residential locations is obtained by writing a2
∑
k uk(X) = 1.
Taking as an approximation the expression (30) for every location, and set-
ting a continuous limit by assuming a small, we obtain how Deff (or equiv-
alently, the number of active sites, Leff = Deff/a) scales with the model
parameters:
Deff = R
√
ln(
D
R
√
Γ
2piα
) (A-18)
Note that the demand pressure, expressed by the ratio Γ
α
, only contributes
through a logarithmic term. For the parameter values (notably D = aL =
100, R = 10) used in the numerical simulations in Section 6, the above
formula gives Deff ' 28, in keeping with what can be seen in, e.g., Fig. 3.
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A.4. Extension to an arbitrary WTP distribution
In the model we have assumed that the K values of WTP are uniformly
distributed among the agents in the external reservoir. One may want to start
with a particular probability distribution function (PDF) of the reservation
price, corresponding to the empirical income distribution of a given popula-
tion, for example. Let Q(P ) be this PDF, with support on [P0, P0 + ∆]. We
can construct the discrete set of K levels from Q(P ) by requiring the same
density of agents in any one of these levels. The {Pk, k = 0, ..., K − 1} are
thus defined by: ∫ Pk
P0
Q(p)dp =
k
K
(A-19)
for k = 1, ..., K (with PK ≡ P0 + ∆). Of particular interest is the large K
limit. In this case, we have Pk = P (k/K), the function P (z) on z ∈ [0, 1]
being given as solution of
∫ P (z)
P0
Q(p)dp = z, or, equivalently by:
Q(P (z)) P ′(z) = 1 (A-20)
where P ′(z) = dP/dz, with P (0) = P0 and P (1) = P0 + ∆.
Formally, all the analysis done in this paper for the uniform case, (1), can
be applied to an arbitrary WTP function. In particular, the critical WTP
threshold is here given by P ∗c = P (z
∗
c ), z
∗
c being obtained by solving the
equation
1
ξ˜
log
P (z∗c )
P 0
− 1 = η
2
(
1− (z∗c )2
)
. (A-21)
The above results can be generalized to the case of agents weighting higher
categories differently, as in Eq. (16), with wk′−k = w(k
′−k
K
). We get:
1
ξ˜
log
P (z∗c )
P 0
− 1 = η
∫ 1
z∗c
dt′
∫ t′
0
dt w(t′ − t). (A-22)
The critical value ηc of η is obtained by setting z
∗
c = 0 in the above equation.
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